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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the action could be set at an earlier date. Such a rule would automatical-
ly cut off the practice of disqualification because of adverse rulings
during discovery or pre-trial procedures. If the right to disqualify a
judge by affidavit were limited to the recommended period, the ob-
jections based on alleged control of discretion and possible vesting of
appellate powers in a district judge would no longer have any validity.
Montana's disqualification statute is, on balance, preferable to the
more restricted methods of recusation. Statutes requiring proof of
actual bias and prejudice are undesirable for several reasons: a litigant
may be put to a great deal of expense gathering evidence to prove bias
and prejudice; the hearing on the question of actual bias and prejudice
is time consuming; and, if the question of prejudice is decided ad-
versely to the litigant, he is required to have his cause heard by a
judge whom he believes to be prejudiced against him. Even in those
states following the federal rule, which allows the judge to consider
only the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, a litigant is put to additional
expense and effort. Temperamental prejudice to the class of litigation
involved may not, by itself, sustain a charge of actual bias and prejudice
against a judge; nor would a personality conflict, or animosity on the
part of the judge toward the attorney or client.39 Yet, a judge may
be unconsciously influenced by any or all of these factors. Proof of
actual bias and prejudice of a judge is extremely difficult.40 Our ad-
vocacy system of practice demands that an attorney be allowed to
disqualify a judge if he feels that his client will not have a fair trial.
Therefore, any of the above reasons should be sufficient. Abuse of
the disqualification statute exists in Montana, and presumably in other
states with similar statutes. In view of the difficulty of proving actual
bias and prejudice, it is submitted that Montana's statute, with pro-
visions to restrict the present abuses, both provides the necessary pro-
tection to the litigant, and keeps the courts free from even the appear-
ance of bias and prejudice.
DOUGLAS D. DASINGER
RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING POLICE INTERROGATION: AN INTRINSIC RIGHT?-
Dennis White, 16 years of age, was taken to the county attorney's office
for questioning in connection with a murder. A confession was elicited
after a three hour interrogation. White alleged that he was not given
the benefit of his constitutional right to counsel. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Montana, held, since defendant was advised of
his right to counsel and his right to remain silent shortly after inter-
rogation began, and since he did not request such assistance, the failure
OClyma v. Kennedy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 AtI. 539 (1894).4 People 'v. Emmett, 123 Cal. App. 678, 12 P.2d 92 (1932).
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to furnish him with counsel was not improper. State v. White, 22 St. Rptr.
803, 405 P.2d 761 (1965).
The concept of a right to counsel has demonstrated a fluctuating
existence in the history of the law, but it has been, at least in some
form, one of the basic procedural rights of criminal defendants. Under
early English common law a right to be represented by counsel arose
only when the defendant was accused of a minor offense, and even then,
counsel could plead only formal points of law. By the time the United
States Constitution was adopted, however, the right to counsel was
firmly established as necessary for fair trial.'
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
provides that, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. ' 2 This amend-
ment has been the criterion for a right to counsel in federal courts.
Before the Sixth Amendment became obligatory on the states, right
to counsel in state courts was determined by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the state constitutions. 3
In 1958 the Supreme Court first treated the question of right to
counsel during police interrogation. The cases of Crooker v. California,4
and Cicenia v. LaGay5 held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require the appointment of counsel in every capital or noncapital felony
case. These cases relied on a rationale promulgated earlier in Betts v.
Brady.6
'For an extended analysis of the history of right to counsel, see Note, An Historical
Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L. J.
1000 (1964).
'U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
311 [N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The right to counsel is
guaranteed by the constitution of every state except Virginia. See Feldman, The
Right to Counsel Under State Law, 1955 Wis. L. REv. 281. In Virginia the right to
counsel is part of the "law of the land." See Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 187 Va.
351, 46 S.E.2d 413 (1948). MONT. CONST. art. III, § 16, provides that, "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. . . ." Identical language appears in the REvIsED CODES OF
MONTANA, 1947, § 94-4806.
Proposed Code §§ 95-901, 95-902, drafted by the Montana Criminal Law Com-
mission, provides that any person making an arrest under a warrant shall take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the judge who shall inform him
of the charge against him, of his right to counsel, and of his right to have counsel
assigned. The intent of these provisions is that the defendant be brought before
the judge prior to the beginning of police interrogation. If this is not done,
evidence obtained therein will be excluded. Proposed Code § 95-1001 provides:
Every defendant brought before the court must be informed by the court that it is his
right to have counsel before proceeding and must be asked if he desires the aid of
counsel. The defendant, if charged with a felony, must be advised that counsel will be
furnished at state expense if he is unable to employ counsel. If the offense charged
is a felony and if the defendant desires counsel and is unable to employ counsel a court
of record must assign counsel to defend him. If the offense charged is a misdemeanor...
a court of record, in the interest of justice, may assign counsel to defend him.
'357 U.S. 433 (1958).
'357 U.S. 504 (1958).
-316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). In Betts, the Court held that due process
formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific
and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Asserted denial is to be tested by an
appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting,
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.
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The Crooker majority believed that the absence of counsel would
render a conviction reversible only when it resulted in a denial of "that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."'7 The
Court seemed hesitant to restrict state criminal law enforcement:" [T] he
doctrine. . .[of an unqualified right to counsel] would have a. . .de-
vastating effect on enforcement of criminal law, for it would effectively
preclude police questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused
was afforded opportunity to call his attorney.""
However, the dissents in Crooker and Cicenia are especially significant
because they reveal the present reasoning of the Supreme Court as ex
pressed in Escobedo v. Illinois.9 Justice Douglas, writing for Justices
Warren, Black, and Brennan, found that the "right to counsel extends
to pretrial proceedings as well as to the trial itself." Counsel, in this
view, performs a twofold function of informing the defendant of his
rights and preventing enroachment on these rights by coercive police
practices. 10 Dougles further noted that "the right to have the assistance
of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge
in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its
denial."" Thus the minority rejected the "fundamental fairness" test 2
of Betts v. Brady, and the concept of right to counsel as merely one
element in the determination of whether a confession was voluntary
or involuntary.3  The net result of this reasoning is that counsel has
an intrinsic and unqualified function in preserving the balance of power
in the adversary system, and his exclusion, unless waived, is auto-
matically prejudicial.
Betts applied a "totality of circumstances" rule which, in essence, held that
where the defendant under the particular circumstances, has been denied "funda-
mental fairness," he has been denied due process. Two facets of this rule should
be noted: (1) the Court was applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment-there had not as yet been any application of an unqualified right to
counsel to state proceedings by virtue of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) the rule
depends on a retrospective analysis of the prejudice, if any, suffered by the defendant
in his particular case.
7Supra note 4, at 439.
81d. at 441. In Cicenia, supra note 5, at 510, the Court held it to be of the
"essence of our federalism that the State would have the widest latitude in the
administration of their own systems of criminal justice."
9378 U.S. 478 (1964).
10 The right to have counsel at the pretrial stage is often necessary to give meaning and
protection to the right to be heard at the trial itself. It may also be necessary as a
restraint on the coercive power of the police. The pattern of the third degree runs
through our cases: a lone suspect unrepresented by counsel against whom the full coerciveforce of a secret inquisition is brought to bear. . . .The trial of the issue of coercion
is seldom helpful. Law officers usually testify one way, the accused another. . . .The
mischief and abuse of the third degree will continue as long as an accused can be
denied the right to counsel at this most critical period of his ordeal.
Crooker v. California, supra note 4, at 443-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Such rea-
soning would seem to indicate that a request for counsel would be immaterial.
"Id. at 442.
"The "fundamental fairness" test has never been used in federal cases where the
Sixth Amendment was applicable. It applied to state non-capital (Betts) and
capital (Crooker) cases to determine a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), has made the voluntary-involuntary
test rather meaningless on facts similar to those of the later Escobedo decision by
holding that the defendant's confession was involuntary. Justice Goldberg, who
wrote the opinion, felt that the absence of counsel was more important than merely
one factor in the determination of the involuntariness of a confession.
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The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainright,14 written by the minority
turned majority,15 effectively made this rationale the law of the land."6
Gideon implicitly asserted that the standard of fundamental fairness
within the totality of circumstances is no longer consonant with the re-
quirements of a fair proceeding, and that an absolute standard is to
take its place. Thus, only a defendant who explicitly and intelligently
waives counsel will now appear at trial or arraignment 7 unaided.' 8 The
Gideon Court went on to expressly overrule the rationale of Betts, re-
garding it as an anomaly in the field of right to counsel.
Escobedo v. Illinois heralds the application of this unqualified right
to counsel to police interrogations. The Court said, "when the process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the ac-
cused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system
begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must
be permitted to consult with his lawyer."' 9 In this statement of the
rule Justice Goldberg limited its effect to the particular circumstances. -0
However, in spite of this language, the foregoing discussion has shown
that the intention of the Court was clear: during police interrogation
the suspect has an unqualified right to counsel which does not depend
on a request for counsel nor a retrospective analysis of how much preju-
dice ensued from its denial, unless this right has been intelligently and
explicitly waived.
The State of Illinois argued in Escobedo that if the right to counsel
is afforded prior to indictment, the number of confessions obtained will
"372 U.S. 335 (1963).
'5By the addition of Justice Goldberg.
"Supra note 14, at 342. "[A] provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental
and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . .[T]he Court in Betts was wrong. . .in concluding that the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights."
"The FFU. R. Cam. P. 44 requires that "If the defendant appears in court without
counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to
represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without
counsel or is able to obtain counsel." This rule attaches at the arraignment. In
the state courts, until Gideon, the right to appointed counsel at arraignment was gov-
erned by the Betts criterion of fundamental fairness, but in Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52(1961), the Supreme Court made it automatically prejudicial to make a
man plead in a capital case without counsel. As to a right to appointed counsel at
preliminary hearing, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), held that the plea of
a man in a capital case without guidance of counsel could not be used at his trial.
Other decisions seem to hold that there arises a right to appointed counsel at pre-
liminary hearing only if something "critical" takes place. See State v. Richardson,
194 Kan. 471, 399 P.2d 799 (1965).
"Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), also decided subsequent to Croaker
and Cicenia, held that the defendant was denied his absolute right to counsel betweer
indictment and trial when government agents secretly elicited incriminating state-
ments from him. The Court held that the statements were not admissible at his
trial. Massiah, unlike Gideon and Escobedo, was a federal case and its rule is not
binding on the state courts.
"Supra note 9, at 492.
'*The Court, id. at 490-91, enumerated these circumstances in its holding:
We hold, therefore, that where. as here, the investigation is no longer a general Inquiry
Into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has
been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been
denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu- 4
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diminish significantly. Such an argument was implicit in the majority
holding of Crooker, but the Court held that :21
The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period
when few confessions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct
relationship between the importance of a stage to the police in their
quest for a confession and the criticalness of that state to the ac-
cused in his need for legal advice .... We have learned the lesson....
that a system of criminal law enforcement... will, in the long run,
be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which
depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation.
The Court thus emphasized that confessions are inherently unreliable,
but more significantly, it noted that the stage wherein confessions are
elicited is a critical stage in the proceedings, and counsel, unless waived,
must be present to help preserve an effective adversary system. In
other words, at this point the "adversary" system begins to function,
and the antagonists must be evenly matched.22 No longer did the Court
feel that giving the accused this right would unduly restrict law en-
forcement.
Since Escobedo was decided, courts in more than half of the states
have faced similar problems. The majority of these do not adhere to
the rule and rationale of the Escobedo Court as analyzed above, but in-
stead either continue to follow Crooker v. California23 or distinguish
Escobedo on its particular facts.
24
In State v. White the Montana Supreme Court similarly distinguished
Escobedo and found no violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
guaranties.
25
In Escobedo the defendant was not effectively advised of his right-
to counsel and his right to remain silent, and further, his request
to consult a lawyer was denied. In the case now before us, the
defendant was advised of his rights and then voluntarily confessed.
At no time during the interrogation did he request the assistance
of counsel, even though asked.
tion as 'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment'. . .and that
no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him
at a criminal trial.
2Supra note 9 at 488.
2See BARTH, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY, 148-72 (1961).
2'The following cases seem to adhere to the totality of circumstances rationale of
Crooker: State v. Richardson, 194 Kan. 471, 399 -P.2d 799 (1965); Carson v. Com-
monwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85 (Ken., 1964); Peee v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422
(1964); State v. Elam, 263 N.C. 273, 139 S.E.2d 601 (1965).
TThe following cases limit the holding of Escobedo to its particular facts and most of
these distinguish their cases on the basis that no request for counsel was made and
denied: Woodard v. State, 171 So.2d 462 (Ala., 1965); State v. Miranda, 98 Ariz.
18, 401 P.2d 716 (1965); Turvey v. Florida, 174 So.2d 609 (Fla., 1965); People v.
Hartgraves, 31 Ill.2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964); Hayden v. State, 201 N.E.2d 329(Ind., 1964); State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa, 1964); Swartz v. State, 237 Md.
263, 205 A.2d 803 (1965); Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 207 N.E.2d 536 (Mass. 1965);
State v. Turnbough, 388 S.W.2d 781 (Mo., 1965); Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251
(Nev., 1965); State v .Scanlon, 84 N.J. Super 427, 202 A.2d 448 (1964); People v.
Agar, 44 Misc.2d 396, 253 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1964); State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St.2d 60,
203 N.E.2d 349 (1964); Davis v. State, 388 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim., 1965); Ward v.
Commonwealth, 205 Va. 564, i38 S.E.2d 293 (1964); State v. Boles, 140 S.E.2d 798
(W. Va., 1965); Broisne v. State, 24 Wis.2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964); State v.
Darst, 399 P.2d 618 (Wash., 1965).
'Instant case, at 764-65.
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The court here seems to hold that the lack of a request for counsel
is an important factor in determining whether there has been a viola-
tion of the right to counsel. However, the above analysis indicates that
the defendant during police interrogation has an unqualified right to
the assistance of counsel, unless intelligently and explicitly waived.
This right does not depend on any circumstances such as the defendant
requesting counsel, or his particular financial status.26 .
In regard to a request for counsel the recent California decision of
People v. Dorado clearly makes the more preferable analysis: "The right
to counsel matures at this critical accusatory stage; the right does not
originate in the accused's assertion of it. The accused's request for
counsel indicates no more than that he, himself, . . .perceived the need
of legal assistance. '27  In State v. Neely the Supreme Court of Oregon
properly extended the rule by holding that before the defendant could
be interrogated, he had to be effectivly informed of both his right to
th assistance of counsel and his right to remain silent. "In the absence
of such knowledge an accused can in no way be deemed to have in-
telligently waived his constitutional rights .... ,,21
The absence of a request for counsel has been shown to have been
used as a basis for distinguishing the rule of Escobedo. This poses an
additional question, however, of whether the absence of a request for
counsel is a "waiver" of the right. In cases where the defendant is
informed of his right to counsel, a waiver analysis might well be an
alternative basis for the court's decision. The difficult question of what
constitutes an effective waiver, however, cannot be treated here.29
The Montana Court seems in error on a related issue. It noted,
"This Court [has] stated that the fact the confession was procured in
the absence of counsel does not affect its admissibility provided it
was otherwise voluntarily given. '30  As has been shown, the Supreme
Court of the United States holds that the right to counsel is "funda-
mental and absolute." It is not merely one of the possibly prejudicial
circumstances; counsel's absence is automatically prejudicial.8 1 The
test of voluntariness must still be used in regard to questions of coercion
"Justice Black asserted in Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 14, at 344, that I IFrom
the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great
emphasis on procedural... safeguards designed to assure... [that] every defendant
stands equal before the law. This ideal cannot be realized if the poor rnan charged
with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him." There is no
distinction in logic nor should there be in practice between retained and appointed
counsel. See also Elison, Assigned Counsel in Montana: The Law and the Practice,
26 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1964).
2742 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, 368 (1965). The California Court also pointed out
that ''to require the request would be to favor the defendant whose sophistication
or status had fortuitously prompted him to make it.'
- 3 9 8 P.2d 482, 487 (Or. 1965).
'A related question is whether the waiver standards in federal courts will apply to
the states by virtue of the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright. In this regard see
Note, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1964). Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), has
held applicable to state proceedings the federal court's rule that the absence of a
request is not a waiver of the right to counsel.
'Bupra note 25, at 765.
"'See note 13 supra.
1965]
6
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and promises of immunity, but it is not to be confused as the test for
determining whether the accused has been denied his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
Law enforcement agencies have been vocal in deprecating the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court. They claim that an expansion of the
right to counsel is directly contrary to the interests of the state. It
would make investigation and control of crime more difficult and be
nearly prohibitive in cost. Further, it would be contrary to our system
of federalism by not permitting the state to administer its own system
of criminal justice. It is then argued that, although the criminal de-
fendant does have Constitutional rights, they must be balanced by
the right of society to regulate itself. The authors of the Constitution
did not so conceive of a "balance of rights." A right was thought to be
a restraint upon governmental power, and the Bill of Rights, a set of
proscriptions forbidding incursion by the government into the activities
of free citizens. Thus, it is clearly anomalous to argue that the "interests"
of society vest a "right" in society. What in fact exists is a balance of
power: a balance in which the might and expertise of the state are
placed vis-a-vis the defendant. If there is to be a balance, an effectively
exercised "adversary system," then the defendant must have aid in
the form of counsel.
The Constitution was not made the supreme law of the land so
that it might guarantee justice. This is not because justice is unattain-
able, but because it is unascertainable. The Constitution guarantees only
that the result, whatever it may be, has been reached in a fair way.
The quintessence of this guarantee is that the possibilities of ascertain-
ing the truth have been exhausted to the utmost, and this result depends
on the adversary system. This process cannot demand absolute equality
in the skill of counsel for the contending parties but it must demand
equality in the right to counsel itself.
It is submitted that the right to counsel is unqualified during in-
terrogation, and that the indigent defendant must be appointed counsel,
absent a waiver, or his confession will be inadmissible. It is naive to
say that this requirement will not significantly alter police interrogation,
both in terms of its character and cost. The presence of counsel will
mean no more, however, than that the defendant is both informed of
his Constitutional guaranties and given a means by which they will
be enforced. It is difficult to logically deny the importance of this
intrinsic function. Moreover, can a system of criminal law enforce-
ment be worth preserving if it depends on a fear that if the defendant
is informed of his Constitutional guaranties, he may exercise them?
HARRY B. ENDSLEY III
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